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Introduction 
 
 
Competition for the ANC 
Dominant Party Losing Youth and Poorer Sections of South African Population 
Melanie Müller 
South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), will elect a new 
president in December 2017. This person will also stand for the office of President of 
South Africa at the beginning of 2019 when President Jacob Zuma reaches the maximum 
number of two consecutive terms allowed by the country’s constitution. It is currently 
unclear whether he can finish his final term. Since the dismissal of finance minister, 
Pravin Gordhan, resistance against Zuma has reached a new climax. A broad alliance of 
civil society groups, trade unions and party representatives, even some from within his 
own party, have called for his resignation. Although these protests are aimed directly at 
Zuma, the causes of the dissatisfaction lie deeper. The ANC has not been able to success-
fully address the country’s social challenges. In addition, corruption and mismanage-
ment have shaken confidence. For a long time, the former liberation movement was 
considered the only party to vote for by the black population. In the past four years, how-
ever, the ANC has faced serious competition from the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). 
Given the loss of meaning of the ANC, the South African party system is changing. 
 
In the 2014 parliamentary elections, the 
ANC failed to achieve a two-thirds majority 
– for the first time in the history of demo-
cratic South Africa. In the 2016 local elec-
tions, its share of votes even fell below 50 
percent in its stronghold of Johannesburg. 
That approval for the ANC would wane has 
been repeatedly predicted since 1994. How-
ever, so far, the Party has always been able 
to secure power. The reasons for this are 
complex: the ANC purposefully expanded 
its influence after the transition to democ-
racy. Like other liberation movements, it 
was able to incorporate different social 
groups into the political system and into its 
network. However, the ANC did not succeed 
in overcoming social injustice in South 
Africa, as promised. 
The importance of the ANC 
after Apartheid 
It is impossible to understand South African 
society today and the importance of the ANC 
without looking at its history. The Apart-
heid regime (1948-1991) divided the popu-
lation into four groups on the basis of racist 
criteria (Blacks, Coloureds, Indians, Whites) 
and ascribed the Whites a higher social 
status because, supposedly, they were the 
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only ‘civilized’ group. The regime then 
adopted laws for the separation of society 
based on these classifications. By the end 
of Apartheid, the proportion of black South 
Africans was around 75 percent, the Col-
oureds ten percent and the Indians three 
percent. The ruling white group accounted 
for around ten percent of the whole popu-
lation. The Apartheid regime allocated par-
ticular residential areas to the population 
groups, with the black districts being the 
most under-resourced. The fragmentation 
of society affected all spheres of life: for ex-
ample, black students had to study at their 
own, inadequately financed universities and 
black schools were also desperately under-
funded. Non-white workers were also for-
bidden to engage in certain higher-value 
activities. 
The ANC assumed a leading role in op-
posing Apartheid. In the mid-1960s, the 
South African government banned the 
liberation movement and then imprisoned 
prominent actors, such as Nelson Mandela. 
However, other ANC members organized 
international resistance to the system of 
Apartheid from exile. Although the ANC was 
by no means the only oppositional force – 
there were other political organizations as 
well as a massive civil society revolt against 
the regime – it achieved a dominant position, 
not least through its international network. 
Since the first free elections in 1994, the 
ANC has been governing at the national 
level in a three-party alliance with the South 
African Communist Party (SACP) and the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU). Only the ANC stood at the parlia-
mentary elections in South Africa. The two 
other parties received a fixed share of ANC 
seats. 
Large sections of civil society were also 
included in the corporatist state model 
which initially left little room for genuine 
opposition. Although the political system 
in South Africa is principally based on a 
multi-party system, to date, it has actually 
been a one-party system. The ANC has succ-
eeded in smashing any emerging opposi-
tion and politically integrating parts of it 
or relegating it to non-parliamentary oppo-
sition. The only party to establish itself as 
an opposition in the National Assembly 
is the Democratic Alliance (DA) which has 
also governed the Western Cape Province 
since 2009 and currently holds 89 of 400 
parliamentary seats. For the black popula-
tion, voting for the DA was taboo for a long 
time, since it was considered a party of the 
white population and, in the initial years 
of democracy, it primarily sought support 
from Whites, Indians and Coloureds. 
Substantial social inequality and 
widespread corruption 
The lack of prospects for many parts of 
the population has led to considerable dis-
satisfaction with the ANC. Since 1994, the 
government has succeeded in reducing 
rates of poverty and developing the supply 
of water and electricity in South Africa. How-
ever, living conditions are still very bad in 
many areas. Almost half of the South Afri-
can population lives in poverty. Black South 
Africans are still the worst affected group 
at 54 percent of the population, followed by 
Coloureds at 27.6 percent. Rates of poverty in 
the rural provinces of Limpopo and Eastern 
Cape are around 60 percent. Even in Cape 
Town, the richest city in the country, a 
quarter of the population lives in poverty. 
South Africa is now one of the countries 
with the highest economic inequality in the 
world. According to official sources, the un-
employment rate in the last quarter of 2016 
was 26.5 percent. Among the black popu-
lation it was as high as 30 percent whereas, 
among the white population, it was only 
6.6 percent. In addition, between 6 and 15 
percent of the population is considered 
underemployed, meaning they engage in 
an activity that is underpaid and/or does 
not correspond to their qualifications. 
A second aspect increasing dissatisfac-
tion among the population is poor govern-
ance: corruption, mismanagement and 
cronyism now pervade South African 
politics. The perception of those whose 
situation has not improved over the last 
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two and a half decades is that parts of the 
ANC have allied with business to enrich 
themselves at the expense of the population. 
Jacob Zuma has further reinforced this wide-
spread view of corruption among the elites 
with his scandals: he maintains a close rela-
tionship with the Gupta family which has 
participating interests in various sectors of 
the economy. The family has frequently 
benefitted from ties to Zuma and has even 
influenced political decisions. This scandal 
was documented in a State of Capture 
Report by Thuli Madonsela, the then Public 
Protector of the state of South Africa. Madon-
sela also revealed that Zuma had misappro-
priated public funds to renovate his private 
estate in Nkandla. This has not yet lead to 
any serious political consequences for Zuma. 
He has succeeded in building up a network 
of allies within the ANC that protects him 
and also benefits politically. The office of 
Public Protector has now been taken over 
by a successor sympathetic to the President. 
Another incisive event for the South Afri-
can population was the violent breakup of a 
miners’ strike in 2012. Police shot 34 strik-
ing workers at the Marikana platinum mine 
and the incident was captured on South 
African television cameras. This approach 
was reminiscent of the Apartheid regime’s 
violent crushing of protests by black South 
Africans in Sharpeville in 1960. Many South 
Africans were shocked that a similar event 
could happen under an ANC-led government. 
Many now call it the Marikana massacre, 
equating it with the Sharpeville massacre. 
Social developments, 
political alternatives 
The ANC is still the party of choice for the 
emerging black middle class, even though 
dissatisfaction is growing within this group. 
The situation is different, however, among 
groups whose economic status has not im-
proved since the end of Apartheid. Large 
parts of this lower strata have turned their 
backs on the ANC since the end of the 1990s 
and have primarily become socially engaged. 
The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) have 
succeeded in making these groups a politi-
cal offer with their left-wing populist rheto-
ric: in 2014, not long after they were founded, 
they won 25 seats in the South African par-
liament with a good 6 percent of the vote. 
Satisfied middle class 
Historically, the black middle class – even 
though its share of population under Apart-
heid was small – has played a significant 
political role in South Africa. Between the 
1940s and the 1970s, the number of black 
children receiving general school education 
rose from 588,000 to 2.7 million. In 1969 
and 1970 two black universities were 
founded giving a few black students an aca-
demic education. Members of this middle 
class also contributed to resistance against 
Apartheid, reaching its climax in the late 
1970s. They were, and still are today, party 
members or committed ANC voters. Accord-
ing to a study by Stellenbosch University, 
the size of the black middle class rose from 
350,000 to three million between 1993 and 
2012. In order to qualify as middle class, 
the study used a minimum annual income 
of 25,000 rand (equivalent to 3250 US dol-
lars in 2000 prices). Another calculation 
assumes an increase to 3.8 million people 
by 2011 and, correspondingly, a rise in the 
middle class to seven percent of the black 
population. Other studies involving not 
only income, but also aspects such as per-
manent employment, the ability to read 
and write, access to basic supplies (water, 
electricity and sanitation) and also owner-
ship of certain items (television, radio or 
refrigerator), produce even higher figures, 
namely an increase in the middle class to 
27 percent of the black population by 2008. 
Many black South Africans have benefit-
ed from programmes aimed at eliminating 
the consequences of discrimination under 
Apartheid. Dissatisfaction with the ANC is, 
therefore, less widespread among those in 
the middle class with positive future pros-
pects. In general, awareness of the harmful 
consequences of corruption and the criteria 
for good governance are growing. Voting for 
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the DA is still not a popular option among 
the black population, however, in 2011 four 
percent of black South Africans said they 
would consider voting for them. The highest 
proportion of this four percent belonged to 
the middle class. In recent years, the DA has 
changed its personnel and its image. In May 
2015, Mmusi Maimane was elected the first 
black Federal Leader of the party. Maimane 
and other aspiring politicians are working 
hard to shake off the old spirit of the party. 
When former DA Leader, Helen Zille, com-
mented on Twitter in mid-March 2017 that 
colonialism had also brought benefits, the 
new leadership responded immediately: 
Maimane publicly disagreed with Zille, 
even though she is the Premier of Western 
Cape, the only province the DA governs. 
The party also called for disciplinary action 
against Zille, emphasizing in this context 
that its objective was to build an economi-
cally prosperous and non-racist democracy. 
The DA could become an attractive option 
for parts of the black middle class growing 
up without economic concerns and com-
mitted to democratic and economic values. 
At the lower end 
At the lower end of the middle class, the 
economic reality is somewhat different: 
members of the lower middle class living in 
precarious conditions are at risk of sliding 
into poverty. Almost half of South Africans 
live in poverty; almost 20 percent in ex-
treme poverty. Since the end of the 1990s, 
mass protests have been repeatedly held 
against the poor living conditions in South 
African townships and in rural areas. The 
starting point was the privatization of basic 
supply companies from 1996, with the 
result that the poor, i.e. black, population 
strata suffered severely. Families who could 
no longer pay their electricity bills were, 
for example, disconnected from supply, 
even though the South African constitution 
guarantees a right to electricity. In addition, 
22 percent of those living in Johannesburg 
and almost 19 percent of those in Cape 
Town live in informal settlements, that is 
in housing without adequate access to run-
ning water, electricity or sanitation. 
There are various social movements spe-
cifically engaged in ensuring general access 
to services of general interest. These local 
groups are important because they repre-
sent the interests of those left behind. Many 
informal settlements or townships with high 
rates of poverty complain that the ANC no 
longer represents them. Mismanagement 
and corruption as well as the ignorance of 
local politicians to the needs of the poor 
have shaken trust in those in government. 
One consequence of this is violence. Crime 
rates in the townships and informal settle-
ments are already very high and the ten-
sion is clearly felt. Political violence esca-
lates quickly here. Demonstrators ignite 
refuse bins or tyres and destroy houses or 
shops to draw attention to the poor local 
conditions. For many groups, political vio-
lence appears to be the only way of attract-
ing attention to their plight. Increasingly, 
violence is directed against migrants from 
other African countries: 2017 saw many 
large-scale xenophobic attacks. The reasons 
for this are not only found in the character-
istics of South African society resulting from 
the Apartheid period, but also in the poor 
living conditions and the fact that these 
attacks are ignored politically. The hatred is 
directed at those who are even lower in the 
social hierarchy. 
The EFF as an alternative 
Before being elected President of the ANC 
in 2007, Jacob Zuma promised to address 
South Africa’s social problems. At the time, 
he beat Thabo Mbeki whom large sections 
of the population accused of neglecting 
social challenges in favour of growth-ori-
ented policies after he came to power in 
1999. Zuma, however, disappointed those 
that elected him as President in 2009. There 
have been several attempts in recent years 
to build a social-democratic or left-leaning 
party as an alternative to the ANC, most 
recently by the National Union of Metal 
Workers of South Africa (NUMSA). Follow-
SWP Comments 18 
May 2017 
5 
ing criticism from the Tripartite Alliance, 
it was excluded from the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) in 2014 and 
has since been working to forge an alliance 
between trade unions and social movements. 
So far, these efforts have been unsuccessful. 
They have not been able to unite the work-
ing class with the lower classes and thus 
form a political alternative to the ANC which 
can integrate a large portion of the popu-
lation. In addition, the ANC has repeatedly 
managed to discredit such initiatives. 
In contrast, the Economic Freedom 
Fighters (EFF) have succeeded in reaching 
the lower strata: the party was founded by 
Julius Malema in 2013 and instantly became 
the third strongest force in the 2014 South 
African elections. The EFF are a party politi-
cal alternative for the poor strata. Their 
goal is to redistribute prosperity in South 
Africa, a claim that strongly appeals to those 
who have not yet benefited from South 
Africa’s economic boom. Certain character-
istics displayed by EFF actors are also im-
portant for their credibility: male members 
of parliament wear red shirts representing 
workers’ garb and the women wear a cos-
tume reminiscent of clothes worn by domes-
tic workers. This symbolism, the anti-capi-
talist rhetoric, but also the EFF’s presence 
on the streets, explain the success of the 
party. 
One of the EFF’s key demands is the re-
distribution of land. At the end of Apart-
heid, 87 percent of South African land was 
owned by white people. In the first five years 
of democracy, the ANC wanted to redistri-
bute 30 percent of land to the black popu-
lation. In 2010, they had only achieved 
8 percent. The reasons for failing to redistri-
bute the land are complex and are not just 
due to a lack of will by the government, but 
the EFF has put this issue back on the politi-
cal agenda. Land reform has been intensively 
debated again since 2016. 
However, Malema’s populist invectives 
repeatedly contain threats against white, 
but also against black, rich South Africans 
and are, therefore, dangerous because these 
invectives fuel the already aggressive politi-
cal climate. But Malema’s political calcula-
tions are working because with this rheto-
ric he is able to win over angry parts of the 
population with few prospects. Since the 
demonstrations against Zuma, the EFF have 
increasingly distanced themselves from the 
violence. Meanwhile, even the DA is cooper-
ating with the EFF to weaken Zuma. In par-
liament, too, these very opposing parties 
are already supporting each other. 
A new generation is growing up 
One new development is the increasingly 
politicized younger generation. The under-
34s make up two-thirds of the South Afri-
can population. It is mainly young South 
Africans who are staging protests in the 
townships as well as in rural areas – not 
least because the lack of prospects is dis-
affecting this age group. South African stu-
dents have also been going out on the streets 
since October 2015. They are demonstrating 
for better study conditions and for a more 
just society. These developments are espe-
cially dangerous for the ANC because young 
voters who did not grow up under Apart-
heid are far less committed to the ANC than 
their parents and grandparents. They are 
challenging the ANC and even the iconic 
figure of Nelson Mandela. 
Lack of future prospects 
Young South Africans born after Apartheid 
have the greatest hopes, but their current 
prospects are bleak: more than half of South 
Africans under the age of 24 live in poverty. 
The rate of poverty is only lower in the 25-
to-34-year-old age group, but is still at 38.7 
percent. According to the International 
Labour Organization, youth unemployment 
in the whole country is 52 percent. Studies 
have shown that poor career prospects at a 
young age frequently affect career outlooks 
in the long term. The reasons for the high 
youth unemployment in South Africa lie 
mainly in unimplemented reforms of the 
country’s education system. It is one of the 
worst in the world among middle-income 
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countries and is also very poor compared to 
the rest of Africa. Under these conditions, 
young South Africans without a university 
education often find it difficult to find a job. 
But the situation is also difficult at uni-
versities. South African students have been 
demonstrating since October 2015. The 
protests were organized under the hashtag 
‘#FeesMustFall’ because they were directly 
connected to the government’s announce-
ment that study fees would increase. There 
are various forms of support for students in 
South Africa. However, these funds are not 
sufficient to cover the higher fees which 
especially affect poorer families. In addi-
tion, state benefits are only available to 
some students. Emerging middle-class fami-
lies usually earn too much to claim them. 
However, their income is not enough to 
cover their children’s study costs or even to 
take out private loans. As a result, poverty 
influences study conditions. At the Uni-
versity of the Witwatersrand in Johannes-
burg, students stay at the university over-
night, for example, because they have to 
travel long distances to get there and can-
not afford accommodation. The protesters 
have allied themselves with the teaching 
staff and with workers in the university 
service sector whose jobs have been out-
sourced to external providers and have 
been precarious ever since. 
Political break with the ANC generation 
The students are not only concerned with 
improving their own economic situations, 
but also with general political and social 
change. The protests have often been com-
pared with those of the 1968 movement 
in Europe and the US because they are the 
expression of a generational conflict. The 
ANC is viewed very negatively by large num-
bers of demonstrators. The students are 
even criticizing the iconic figure of Nelson 
Mandela: they are suggesting that, after the 
transition to democracy, he had made too 
many economic compromises to maintain 
social peace in South Africa. Although young 
demonstrators were born in freedom, they 
do not feel free, but continue to be stigma-
tized by the legacy of Apartheid. As a result, 
their demands also include the decoloniza-
tion of the universities. Students at the Uni-
versity of Cape Town demanded the removal 
of symbols evoking the colonial era. The cur-
ricula are also to be revised to take more 
account of African political philosophy and 
non-Western theories. More black scientists 
should be appointed at universities. Stu-
dents also reject teaching in Afrikaans at 
some universities. 
Overall, South Africa’s youth is becom-
ing increasingly disappointed with the 
political system and with the ANC. A study 
by the Pretoria-based Institute for Security 
Studies from 2016 shows that only 33 per-
cent of 18-to-19-year-olds were registered 
to vote in national elections. Nevertheless, 
among 20-to-29-year-olds, the figure was 64 
percent. Young South Africans believe that 
protests are more effective in bringing about 
social change than voting for a political 
party. While, previously, they tended to 
vote for the same party as their parents, the 
share of young voters voting for the ANC is 
now only 30 percent, for the EFF this figure 
is 49 percent and for the DA 14 percent. 
There have been no political alliances be-
tween student movements and any parties, 
to date. The EFF played an important role in 
supporting the protests at the University of 
Pretoria, but this was an exception. Never-
theless, the impact of student protests 
should not be underestimated as they make 
a contribution towards re-politicizing the 
youth of South Africa. It is assumed that 
more of them will go out and vote at the 
next elections in 2019 and, therefore, un-
surprising that all political parties, even 
the ANC, are heavily canvassing the student 
vote. Jacob Zuma has since suspended the 
increase in study fees, but rejection of the 
President is now so widespread among the 
young population that even this step has 
not made him more popular. 
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Outlook 
The long predicted downfall of the ANC has 
not been abrupt, but it has begun. The EFF 
has now become a second opposition party 
which, unlike the DA, has succeeded in 
winning over broader sections of the black 
population. But even the DA is no longer 
considered unelectable. Young South Afri-
cans, who are increasingly turning away 
from the ANC, will play a greater role in the 
2019 elections. The ANC must increase its 
efforts to regain the lost trust and to achieve 
this will take more than just Jacob Zuma’s 
resignation. An even greater influence on 
the future of the governing party will be 
the question of who succeeds him. 
Two options are currently being dis-
cussed. The first is ‘business as usual’: Zuma 
wants someone from his own network to 
succeed him, someone who will not only 
secure his legacy but also protect him against 
any criminal consequences when his term 
of office ends. His current favourite is his 
ex-wife Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma who, 
until January 2017, was Chairperson of the 
African Union Commission. Her proximity 
to Zuma is also her greatest weakness. An-
other solution might be Malusi Gigaba, the 
new finance minister, who is particularly 
favoured by the ANC’s powerful youth orga-
nization. The 45-year-old intends to reach 
younger voters but Gigaba is also an active 
supporter of Zuma. If the President’s poli-
cies are simply continued, this would lead 
to the population further losing confidence 
in the party. There might even be a split 
within the ANC. 
The second conceivable option is that 
Cyril Ramaphosa, the current Deputy Presi-
dent of South Africa, will be voted in at the 
ANC’s 54th National Conference. He is sup-
ported by the ANC in the northern province 
of Gauteng, by COSATU and by the South 
African Communist Party. Ramaphosa is not 
the best candidate. Politically, he has no 
longer been uncontroversial since the Mari-
kana massacre. He had called for greater 
police intervention only a few days before 
the workers were murdered. His ties to the 
economy are too close for many South Afri-
cans, he is one of the richest men in the 
country. Ramaphosa is trying very hard 
to regain his lost credibility. He officially 
apologized for the Marikana massacre in 
early May 2017, almost five years after the 
event, but this was a tactical move that 
brought him more criticism than trust. 
There are, however, no other suitable can-
didates on the horizon. In recent years, the 
power struggles within the ANC have been 
fought so bitterly that there are only a few 
prominent representatives in the party 
who are able to act independently and who 
could stand against Zuma or Ramaphosa 
without their own network. 
Current developments in the ANC have 
seriously damaged the political and eco-
nomic stability of South Africa. The sacking 
of finance minister Pravin Gordhan is a 
good example: rating agencies subsequent-
ly downgraded the creditworthiness of the 
country. In the South African Development 
Community (SADC), South Africa is increas-
ingly losing its leadership role which is im-
portant for the stability of the region because 
domestic policy determines day-to-day busi-
ness. It is a source of some concern that 
internal political tensions are increasingly 
turning into violence. This is exacerbating 
the situation in South Africa which already 
has major problems with crime and vio-
lence. The government under Jacob Zuma 
has done little to de-escalate the protests. 
Protests are repeatedly quashed or violently 
suppressed by groups supporting the ANC. 
South Africa’s weekly newspaper, the Mail & 
Guardian, reported that ANC members who 
publicly speak out against Jacob Zuma have 
received death threats. Even though South 
African democracy is still considered stable, 
these developments should be observed 
closely. If Zuma successfully continues his 
policies of patronage and corruption through 
a successor he approves of, the political 
situation in South Africa might deteriorate 
further. This would also endanger stability 
in southern Africa. 
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